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A growing proportion  of international  trade  within the Association  of Southeast  Asian Nations (ASEAN)
occurs  within multinational  enterprises.  This paper  reviews  the present  trade  and  foreign investment
environment  within ASEAN members  and  analyzes  the impact  of an ASEAN free trade  agreement
(AFf A) on foreign investment  in the region. We anticipate  that  a reduction  of regional  trade  barriers
will make  South  East  Asia a more  attractive  investment  destination  to both  service  ASEAN consumers
and  integrate  production  processes  within the  region. Some  indications  about  potential  changes  in the
allocations  of investment  within the region  are  also  provided.
11. Introduction
While conceived  primarily as  a forum  to diffuse regional  tensions,  the Association  of South-East
Asian  Nations (ASEAN) has  grown  into a vehicle  to promote  regional  integration  and cooperation  on
many  fronts. Arguably, a primary  goal of ASEAN is to support  a regional  effort to liberalize  trade,  but a
concurrent  goal is to attract  inflows of foreign  direct  investment  (FDI) to ASEAN by enhancing  market
access  and  creating  a more  vibrant, stable,  and  competitive  regional  economic  climate. In the long run, it
is hoped  that PDT  inflows will transfer  foreign  technology  and  enhance  productivity  and  economic
growth. Yet, the mechanisms  by which regional  integration  will influence  FDI are not well understood.
The goal of this paper  is to assess  the theory  and  evidence  on regional  integration  to gain insight  into the
impact  of ASEAN trade integration  on FDI to member  countries  and  the region  as  a whole.
One of the challenges  in analyzing  FDI and  regional  integration  is the multiple layers  of
distortion  to trade  and investment  that  are  involved. While preferential  trade  areas  (PTAs)  do lower
barriers  to intra-regional  trade,  they  also  discriminate  against  non-members  in complicated  ways.
Furthennore,  regional  integration  efforts can easily  overlook  domestic  distortions  that inhibit efficient
trade  and  investment.  In section  2 we review  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature on  regional
integration  and  FDI.  This analysis  indicates  that  ASEAN  trade  integration  will affect both  the
attractiveness  of the region  to outside  investors  and  the cuuent distribution  and  nature  of investments
already  made  in ASEAN. Thus,  while investments  in the region  are not universally  believed  to be for the
purpose  of servicing  the regional  market,  this could  change  if integration  efforts are  successful  in freeing
intra-regional  trade. Existing investments  may  be  rationalized,  with various  pieces  of the regional
production  process  consolidated  and  each  located  to exploit  geographic  advantages.  This change  in the
nature  of ASEAN FDI is likely to impact  both  horizontal  FDI meant  to overcome  distortions  in the trade
of final goods  as well as vertical  FDI meant  to take  advantage  of differences  in input factor  costs.
Section  3 provides  an overview  of the ASEAN  economies  and  the  economic  diversity within the
region. While the members  do share  similarly impressive  rates  of economic  growth, ASEAN members
2vary significantly in the structure  of their  economies  and  thus in their  patterns  of comparative  advantage.
This suggests  each  individual member  economy  is best  suited  to attract  a different  piece  of the
production  process  undertaken  by multinationals. ASEAN  has  been  fairly successful  in attracting  FDI to
the region because  of favorable characteristics such  as plentiful  cheap labor of relatively  high skill and
good infrastructure and communications in some  parts, notably Singapore. However, most ASEAN
members still  maintain regimes that heavily distort FDI inflows.  We look at the pattern ofFDI  in the
major ASEAN  partners and thereby gain some sense  of the impact of these  distortions,  which is essential
in understanding how another set of distortions (i.e., on trade) will  influence regional FDI.
We highlight  some of the important pillars  of ASEAN economic integration in Section 4.  While
internal trade is still a relatively  small portion of ASEAN trade, it the potential to increase significantly
as intra-regional trade is liberalized.  ASEAN economic integration is also designed to attract FDI to the
region and promote linkages between global and local firms.  ASEAN  integration is likely to see
rationalization  of existing investment, but this does not mean the relocation of entire industries.  Rather,
firms are likely  to consolidate some production processes  while  at the same  time geographically
distributing  these activities to reap the best benefit from member  comparative advantages  provided
investment and trade in the region is substantially liberalized.  Section 5 concludes with  our predictions
and proscriptions  for capturing the most benefit from the natural behavior of multinational  firms.
2.  Regional integration and foreign direct investment: Theory and evidence
2.1  Theory
The sorts  of integration  that  receive  the most  attention  by economists  are political agreements
that shift the pattern  of trade  distortions  in favor of member  countries.  These  PT  As reduce  or eliminate
trade  barriers  between  member  countries  and  mayor may  not  harmonize  barriers  to external  trade. That
such  agreements  should  impact  trade  flows and  patterns  is un  surprising,  and  the literature analyzing  the
1  A free trade  area  such  as  NAFfA  leaves  each  member  free  to unilaterally  set  its external  trade  barriers,  while a
customs  union such  as  the European  Union  requires  each  member  to adhere  to a common  external  trade  regime.
However,  this is not  to say  countries  cannot  or do not  find ways  to discriminate  against  foreigners.
3trade  effects of PT  As is quite  voluminous: However,  until recently  there  has  been  little analysis  of the
impact of PT  As on FDI at either the theoretical or empirical level.
While  PTA formation will  obviously influence trade and investment patterns, the direction of
these effects is far from evident as several  layers of economic distortion are involved.  Regional
integration agreements  are inherently second-best;  expanding market size and liberalizing  trade between
participants, but also discriminating  against  non-members in rather complicated ways.3 FDI tends to
arise in imperfectly competitive markets in order to internalize economic distortions.  Often,
multinational  firms are exploiting the services of a firm-specific,  intangible asset  that is non-rival  in
production across plants within a given firm (Caves 1996 and Markusen 1995). This asset, such as a
production blueprint  or managerial expertise, can be moved relatively easily across borders and so such a
firm  will  have an incentive to jump barriers to the free flow  of goods and factors of production provided
the cost of setting up a subsidiary is not too high.  In this way FDI can substitute for trade as local
production supplants imports, or can complement trade through an increase in intra-firm  trade in
intermediate inputs (Konan forthcoming).  Note that this implies that trade analyses of PT  A formation,  or
any other change in the pattern of trade distortions, that neglect the possibility of multinational
production  will  likely  come to erroneous conclusions.
There now exist a few models that explicitly  look at the effects of PT  As on FDI,  each more
appropriate to a particular  sort of PT  A arrangement  between FDI source and host countries.  We can
broadly define three sorts ofPTA:  that between sources, such  as might characterize the European Union;
that between source and host, such as NAFfA  which includes the U.S. and Mexico,  or the many bilateral
PTAs between the EU and its Mediterranean and Central European  neighbors; and PTAs between host
countries, such as MERCOSUR  or the focus of this paper, ASEAN.
2  See  Baldwin and  Venables  (1995)  for an  excellent  survey  of the theoretical  literature. Frankel  (1997)  provides
some  empirical  analysis  of the  relevance  of regional  trading  blocs.
3  Bhagwati  and  Panagariya  (1996)  offer a good  discussion  of these  issues.
4.Motta and  Norman  (1996)  employ  a three-country  model  that  highlights  horizontal  FDI between
source  countries,  arising  in an oligopolistic  environment,  with all firms and  countries  being  identical
except  for formation of a customs  union between  two of the countries. Each  country  is assumed  to have
a single,  indigenous  firm which must  consider  the trade-off  between  incurring  trade  costs  associated  with
exporting  versus  the cost  of building  a new  production  facility.4 Perhaps  the most significant  result is the
investment  replacement  effect. Regional  firms face  a reduced  level of internal  trade  distortion  and  so
rationalize  their regional  FOI, switching  instead  to intra-regional  trade  as  firms seek  economies  of scale
in production. This investment  is replaced  by the external  firm, which  establishes  an export  platform in
the region  and  contributes  to even  greater  intra-regional  trade.5
Traditional  analyses  suggest  that small  countries  may  have  little to gain,  and may  even  lose, from
contemporary  regional  agreements  in which they  link up with large  countries  and  engage  in mainly
unilateral  reforms. Ethier's  (1996)  model  suggests  small  host  countries  gain  from integration  with a large
source  country  when  FDI flows are  influenced. Marginally preferential  access  to the larger  partner's
final goods market can allow the smaller country to attract FDI for the purpose of exporting the finished
product back to the large country.
In Konan and Heinrich (1997), we analyze integration among host economies in the context of
horizontal Fill.  We construct a general equilibrium  model asymmetric countries and monopolistically
competitive  foreign firms who export to the region or produce within the region through multination
subsidiaries.6 We find  that the level of external protection has a magnification effect.  If the integrating
4  This .is  a common  approach  in analyzing  horizontal  investment  driven  by distortions  in the goods  market,  such  as
tariffs. See  Horstmann  and Markusen  (1992)  and  Markusen  and  Venables  (1994)  for examples.
5  These  researchers  also  find the  interesting  possibility  that  the external  firm may  be excluded  altogether.  This
happens  when  intra-regional  pre-integration  trade  barriers  are  high enough  and  countries  small  enough  that regional
firms undertake  no FDI and  the external  fIrm benefits  from  producing  in the  protected  regional  markets,  but as
internal  barriers  fall regional  firms  can  become  sufficiently  competitive  that  the external  firm is driven out of the
region. 6  In this model, it is not necessarily  the  case  that  MNEs be  based  outside  the  integrating  region  because  an
assumption  of free entry  drives  profits  to zero,  and  thus  no repatriation  of profits which  might affect  welfare
computations.  In the general  equilibrium  version,  "home"  will matter  as  that  is where  the flfIn must  tap  skilled labor
for firm-specific headquarter  services.
~region  provides  a more  favorable  climate for investment  then  the higher  is the external  tariff the greater  is
the incentive for tariff-jumping FDI. However,  if multinationals  over-invested  in the region  prior to
integration  the PTA may  lead  to reverse  tariff-jumping, which  is exacerbated  as  external  tariff rates
increase.  Second,  any  increase  in FDI to the region  tends  to favor low tariff countries  at  the expense  of
high tariff countries. Before integration  MNEs tend  to flow disproportionately  into high protection
countries,  which draws  resources  out of other  sectors  and  increase  factor  prices. Integration  permits  a
more regionally-efficient  distribution  of multinationals  as  firms can  service  high-tariff members  by intra-
regional  exports  from subsidiaries  in low-tariff members.  Third, there  is no clear  relationship  between  a
country's comparative  advantage  relative  to other  PTA members  and  PTA-induced  FDI.  The PTA favors
the country with a regional  comparative  advantage  in the industrial  sector  as  a general  rule, but other
factors tend to be more telling  when considering the impact of the PT A on FDI flows.  Fourth, as is the
case for national firms, the larger is the region relative to non-member  countries, the greater is the
responsiveness of regional multinational  activity to integration.  Finally,  the PTA favors small members
in terms of FDI inflows  as they gain improved access  to large countries upon integration:
2.2 Evidence
There  is relatively  little evidence  indicating  what  might happen  to FDI flows upon  regional
integration,  with the exception  of the European  experience.  The long history of European  integration  has
allowed for a fair amount  of empirical  study,  but most  other  integration  efforts are  too new  to provide
sufficient  time series  data  and  consequently  rely more  on  the compilation  of stylized  facts.
European  integration  from the inception  of the Common  Market  to the mid-1980's  was  a period
distinguished mainly by reduced tariff barriers on intra-European trade.  Studies on FDI during this
period  found that  EC formation  was  a significant  factor in attracting  FDI from the United States.
Additional support  for this conclusion  comes  from evidence  that  the ascension  of Ireland  to the EC lead
7  These  studies  also look into the welfare  impacts  on individual  members  upon  integration,  particularly  as  to how
these  effects  contrast  with those  found in integration  models  that  exclude  FDI.  However,  as  our focus in on  the
effect of integration  on  FDI patterns,  we suppress  the discussion  of welfare  effects.
6to a significant  inflow  of FDI from without and within the EC, though the UK did not see such an
increase in FDI inflows  when itjoined.8  These flow effects were largely due to reduced barriers to intra-
European trade.  The advent of the Single Market program saw a larger surge in FDI destined for Europe,
particularly  from Japan and the United States  (World Trade Organization 1995).  Balasubrarnanyam  and
Greenaway (1993) suggest  this later surge in Japanese  FDI toward Europe was more as a response  to the
promise of a larger European market rather than the threat of a "Fortress Europe."  While  perhaps of
limited  relevance to ASEAN,  this evidence suggests  that the "market expansion" effect enhances  a
region's attractiveness to potential MNEs.  Blomstrom and Kokko  (1996) cite evidence that the earlier
stage of European integration did prompt a shift in the pattern of production by EC-based MNEs,
suggesting that regional MNEs may be more influenced by the "rationalization"effect,  with a similar
effect found to occur in Canadian-US bilateral investment following  the CUSFfA.
Blomstrom and Kokko  (1996) also examine Mexico's  ascension  to the NAFrA  and the
formation  of MERCOSUR  including Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay  and Uruguay.  Mexico  did experience
significant  FDI inflows  following  NAFT A, but these  flows were notably from outsiders seeking to
exploit Mexico's  locational advantages  at the same  time as they gain access  to the North American
market.  These authors also highlight an important contemporaneous  effect that clouds the apparent effect
of NAFT A on Mexican  FDI inflows:  Mexico  was continuing a broad program of economic liberalization
which may have induced increased FDI inflows  in its own right, and it is exceedingly difficult  to
disentangle the effect of NAFf  A from that of the larger liberalization program.  Indeed, US FDI inflows
to Mexico  surged most notably when Mexico began liberalizing its investment regime in 1989, with little
apparent effect on US FDI following  NAFfA.  Again, we see  substantial impact on extra-regional FDI
patterns following  a PT  A.
8  See  UNCTC (1993)  and  the  citations  therein. That  the  UK did not  see  a significant  inflow in FDI when  it joined
the EC is suspected  to be due  to the fact that  firms  had already  exploited  its locational  advantages  before  then.
Blomstrom  and  Kokko (1996)  provide  data  suggesting  that  the  Canada-US  Free  Trade  Agreement  had  a muted  effect
on FDI flows into Canada  for a similar reason,  particularly  since  Canada-US  bilateral  trade  had been  substantially
liberalized  before  the CUSFT  A.
7In the case  of MERCOSUR,  the pattern  of trade  and  investment  policy distortion in and among
the member  economies  has  been  in a high  state  of flux since  the  bloc's inception. Argentina  attracted
investment  by finally achieving  a measure  of macroeconomic  stability, and  through  a large privatization
program  that  attracted  foreign  buyers. With the other  hand,  it increased  external  barriers  to automobile
imports.  Brazil is in similar circumstances,  but saw  a less  steady  increase  in inward FDI following the .
formation of MERCOSUR. However,  one  reason  that  a substantial  impact  of MERCOSUR  on inward
FDI was not found by Blomstrom and Kokko  (1996) could be that the level of investments in the region
was fairly  steady, but how investments were organized across  the region changed. Bannister, Primo
Braga and Petry (1994) present  evidence suggesting  that firms rationalized their production across all of
South America  by concentrating particular activities in one location, though the different stages of
production would be broken up and presumably located to the best benefit of the multinational.
3. The ASEAN  region
3.1.  Overview of  ASEANeconomies
Selected  summary  statistics  on  the ASEAN  economies  are  presented  in Table 1. As is well
appreciated,  virtually all of these  economies  have  experienced  remarkable  growth over  the past  decade
with an  average  GDP growth  rate of nearly  7%. Much of this growth  has  been  achieved  by rapid input
factor accumulation  (Young 1995)  and  vigorous  promotion  of export  expansion  as  a means  to achieve
some  modicum  of global  competitiveness  (World Bank 1993). A strong  majority of ASEAN nations  are
intimately  connected  to the external  environment  as can  be seen  from the significant  contribution  of trade
to economic  activity. However,  what  is more  remarkable  about  the ASEAN group  is the differences
among  its members  rather  than  the similarities. The group  includes  everything  from the thoroughly
modern,  well-to-do economy  of Singapore  to the extremely  poor  economies  of Vietnam  and  Lao PDR,
and everything in between.  Using illiteracy  and the number of secondary  level teachers as a portion of
the population as rough measures  of the education or skill of the workforce, there is likely  considerable
variation in the sorts of skills each member  has to offer.  Members also vary in the importance of external















































































































ASEAN 214,563 .146 1,739 40 44 839.3
-~
Sources: Compiled  from World Bank  (1997,  1998),  & ASEAN Secretariat
Note:  <.!!)  % of illiterate  population aged over 14.
trade  to their economies,  and in the composition  of that  trade.
A selection  of summary  structural  characteristics  is presented  in Table  2. This also  illustrates
that  there  are important  similarities,  but  perhaps  more  importantly  also significant  differences. A large
portion of merchandise  trade  throughout  Asia is in manufactures,  over  three-quarters  of trade in many
cases. This is perhaps in spite of the fact that, with the exception of Singapore, ASEAN  members tend to
have  moderately  high  tariffs on manufacturing  imports. This apparent  contradiction  is circumstantial
evidence  that many  layers  of economic  distortion  are  involved. For  example,  investment  measures  in
these  economies  often favor manufacture  for export  by foreign  firms, and simultaneously  facilitate the
importation  of manufactured  intermediate  inputs  for producing  such  exports. This occurs  concurrently
with policies that  discourage  foreign participation  in the local  market,  with strong  restrictions  in foreign











)83112Manufacturing  is a significant  portion of most  ASEAN  economies'  production. An indication of
differences  is in the relative size  of the service  sector.  The Singapore  economy  is clearly  the most  reliant
on services  which corresponds  to a relatively  high stock  of human  capital  and  infrastructure,  and cheap
communications.  Survey  evidence  indicates  this is an important  motivation  for MNEs to locate  R&D
and regional  headquarter  services  there  while they conduct  production  elsewhere  [Dobson  and  Yue
(1997)]. Table  2 also  shows  that  aside  from manufacturing,  ASEAN  economies  do vary somewhat  in the
composition  of their trade  and  manufacturing  activities.
3.2. Historical FDI patterns  in the region
One indication  of the relative  importance  of multinational  activity in the region  is FDI inflows as
measured  by balance-of-payments  statistics.  This measure  is an imperfect  indicator  for a couple of
reasons.  It represents  only one  form of firm financing  (e.g.,  it excludes  reinvested  earnings)  and  thus
tends  to be more  volatile then  measures  of subsidiary  activities  such  as  sales  or employment. Financial
statistics  also  do not fully characterize  the actual  activity level of multinational  firms, such  as their
involvement  in production,  international  trade,  or employment.  Other  data  on ASEAN firm operations,
however,  are  limited and not necessarily  comparable  across  countries.
The UNCTAD data  on FDI inflows into ASEAN and  other  regions  of interest  are given in Table
3. The ASEAN region  attracted  about  one  third of FDI flows to developing  countries  in 1991  and  has
remained  an important  destination  in the 1990s.9  This is due  largely  to rapid regional  growth,  a skilled
and  cost-effective  labor  force,  and  a favorable  political environment.  Viet Nam  experienced  dramatic
increases  in FDI after  the U.S. restored  diplomatic  relations  in 1995  and  currently  rivals Thailand in FDI
inflows. ASEAN's share  of developing  country  inflows, however,  dropped  to 20.5%  in 1996. This is, in
part, due  to the recent  emergence  of China  as  an important  FDI host. As the recent  financial  crisis in

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-East  Asia revealed,  the region  is also  adjusting  to problems  of capacity  constraints,  rising labor
costs,  infrastructure  shortfalls,  and  political transparency.  The financial  crisis involved a sharp
decrease  in private external  capital  flows, most  especially  in Indonesia,  the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia,  Philippines  and  Thailand. Net  private  bank  lending  and  foreign  portfolio equity
investment  are  estimated  to be  negative,  making  the financing  of new  projects  more  challenging.
In spite  of this credit  crunch,  FDI inflows are  estimated  to have  risen  slightly in 1997  and  data on
approved  FDI projects  indicate  that  this stability in FDI may  likely continue  into 1998
(UNCTAD 1998).  This is not surprising  as  FDI flows represent  long-term  commitments  and  the
fundamentals  of the region  are  less  disturbed  by the currency  crisis than nominal  changes  might
suggest.
Table 3:  FDI inflows into ASEAN countries  and  other  re ions Billions of Dollars)








































































































































Source:  UNCTAD (1997),  UNCTAD (1998).
Note:  <.!!l  estimates
Some  insights on  the relative  importance  of FDI in the overall economy  may  be gained
by evaluating FDI inflows  relative to gross domestic product, Table 4.  Reflecting demand for
fixed capital, FDI stock as a percentage of GDP is often slightly higher in developing countries
than in advanced countries (15.4 percent versus  9.1 percent in 1995).  In comparison, the role of
12FDI in the ASEAN economies  of Singapore,  Malaysia,  and  Indonesia  have  been  phenomenal
with  stock to GDP ratios from a quarter to upwards of 76 percent in 1995. Viet  Nam has also
experienced dramatic inflows  of investment, with stocks reaching 32 percent of GDP by 1995.
Due to restrictive  PDT  policies and a weaker economic climate, multinationals have had a more
modest presence in Thailand and the Philippines, with FOI stocks representing close to a tenth of
their GDP in 1995.
Table  4: Inward FDI stock  as  a percent  of GDP














































































Source:  UNCTAD (1997).
There  are significant  data  constraints  on multinational  activities within ASEAN, such  as
industrial  composition,  sales,  exports,  and  employment.  The  data  that  are  reported  for one
country  are rarely  comparable  to those  of other  countries.  We thus get  an imperfect
understanding  of multinational  activity by looking  at  case  studies  and  third-country  evidence.
One such  secondary  source  is the  United  States  Department  of Commerce  Benchmark
(US DOC 1998)  data,  which  reports  a survey  of U.S.  firms on their foreign  affiliate activities.
The activities  of U.S. subsidiaries  give partial insight  on  the role of multinational  activity in
ASEAN. We cannot,  however,  assume  that  activities  of U.S.  firms are  average  or typical in the
13region.  Although the U.S. is a major FDI source  country, FDI from Japan, Europe, and within
Asia are also important and firms  from non-U.S. sources may differ  from U.S. multinationals  in
important ways.  In electronics production, for example, U.S. subsidiaries in ASEAN  tend to be
concentrated in the production of intermediate components for high technology industry while
Japanese  firms focus on producing final electronics goods for mass  consumption.  In addition,
the DOC suppresses  some data to protect the confidentiality  of the investor.
Table 5 shows the industrial composition of sales by US headquartered  affiliates  in the
ASEAN-5.10  Investment by U.S. firms in ASEAN is concentrated in petroleum (27%), industrial
machinery and equipment (18%), electronics and electrical equipment (14%), and wholesale
trade (14%).  The direct presence of U.S. firms is most concentrated in Singapore with over sixty
percent of sales amongst the US affiliates  in the ASEAN-5,  with Singaporean affiliates  engaging
in sales in a wide diversity of sectors from machinery and electronics manufacturing to
petroleum sales to wholesale trade.  Singapore's  natural deep harbor and conveniently central
location has provided an historic role as a facilitator  of trade.  Complementing these roots,
Singapore provides both a transparent, market-based  legal system that supports property rights
and encourages entrepreneurship and a sophisticated education system. As Chia Siow Yue
(1997) notes, in addition to serving its traditional role as a regional entrepot Singapore has
become a base for multinational  headquarter  activities in the region.  Sales by US affiliates  in
Indonesia are disproportionately concentrated in petroleum (63% of total Indonesian affiliate
sales,  Table 5).  The drop in energy prices in the rnid-1980s provided the impetus for
liberalization  of the economy which, prior to that time, was heavily regulated under the import-
substitution development strategy. The tariff structure was rationalized and restrictions  on



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)foreign ownership  relaxed  (though  still heavily  regulated).  The industrial  structure  of FDI in
Pangestu's  (1997)  review  ofFDI  approval  data,  the highest  growth in FDI was  experienced  in
chemicals,  paper  and  metal  goods. Multinationals  in Indonesia  are largely  externally  oriented,
with export  propensities  of over 77 percent  in oil and  other  primary  products  and roughly 64
percent  for US subsidiaries  overall  (Table  6). Manufacturing  FDI activities  also appear  to be
characterized  by high import  propensities.  A survey  of electronics  investors  revealed  more  than
75 percent  imported  over  two-thirds of their inputs [Pangestu  (1997)].
In comparison,  Malay, Thai, and  Filipino affiliate firms are much  more  focused  on
manufacturing  activities. Foreign  investment  in Malaysia  grew  rapidly since  the 1980s  (Table  3).
By 1995,  the stock  of inward FDI surpassed  fifty percent  of Malaysian  GDP  (Table  4). Foreign
investors  in Malaysia  are heavily  concentrated  in the  electronics  sector  (Table 5) and  tend  to be
very export  oriented  (Table  6). Malaysia  is amongst  the world's largest  producers  of
semiconductors,  videocassette  recorders,  and  room  air conditioners,  these  accounting  for 44
percent  of manufacturing  output  in 1994  (Ling and  Yong 1997). Although not  reflected  by U.S.
firm activities,  auto production  for domestic  consumption  (80-87  percent  of sales)  also  attracts
investment  from Japan  and  Europe. This is largely  due  to domestic  protectionism  and stringent
local content  provisions  in the local  automobile  market. As discussed  in the next  section,
Malaysia  restricts  foreign  operations  through  a variety  of ownership  restrictions  and  performance
requirements  and  generally  favors  export-oriented  manufacturers.
Foreign  investment  stock  in the  Philippines  and  Thailand  are  a much  smaller  share  of
their overall  economies  than  is the  case  elsewhere  in the  ASEAN-5 (Table  3:  FDI stock  share  of
GDP  reached  roughly one-tenth  by 1995). Philippine  and  Thai multinational  production  is
concentrated  in the manufacturing  sectors  of electronics  and  textiles  and  apparel,  though
16market  participation. Due  to a long historical  relationship,  U.S.  firms are  more  tolerated  in the
Philippines  where  they  do sell  to the local  market.
Table  7:  Gross  Product  of U.S.  Affiliates by Component  1994
Employees  (thousands)  Employee
Compensation





























u.s.  Department  of Commerce  (1998)
The U.S. Department  of Commerce  survey  data  also  provides  information  on  the
components  of labor in the gross  product  of US foreign  affiliates (Table  7). Employee
compensation  represented  the largest  share  of gross  output  in Singapore  (36.6 percent)  and  the
smallest  in Indonesia  (roughly  fifteen  percent). Throughout  the  ASEAN-5,  employees  in
research  and development  activities  were  rare,  comprising  at most  one  percent  (Singapore)  of
total employees.  This gives  some  indication  that, at least  for U.S.  multinationals,  ASEAN firms
have  not contributed  significantly  to very  high-end  finn activities.
3.3 Investment  measures  in select  ASEAN  countries
Major efforts to deregulate,  liberalize,  and  privatize  the economies  of ASEAN began  in
the  mid-1980s.11  The relatively  rapid switch  to more  liberal FDI policies  reflected  the growing
awareness  that FDI contributes  to industrial  performance,  economic  growth  and  competitiveness,
and  human  capital  development.  Prior  to that  time,  the FDI regulatory  regime  was somewhat
restrictive in all but the unusual  case  of Singapore.  Reform  has  proceeded  along  several  fronts























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-transparent  and  corruption-free  legal system  Singapore  is consistently  ranked  in business  surveys
amongst the most attractive investment locations globally. 12  The foreign investment regime in Malaysia
domestic  social  policies. The Malaysian  Industrial  Development  Authority (MIDA) acts  as  a one-stop
perhaps  the most  obvious  constraint  on FDI has  been  restrictions  on foreign equity  participation. With
indigenous  Malaysians  (Bumiputera)  and  a 30 percent  maximum  for foreigners.  These  ownership
restrictions  were  liberalized somewhat  in the mid-1980s.  Full foreign  equity  is granted  to firms that
export  more  than 80 percent  of production,  but  the  percentage  of foreign  participation  permitted  declines
foreign shareholder  limits somewhat  as well relaxing  the Bumiputera  policy to allow acquisition  by
domestic  non-Bumiputera.  In addition  to those  on  exports,  performance  requirements  and  incentives  still
exist  to encourage  pioneering  activities,  technology  transfers,  involvement  in manufacturing  and  mining,
and  domestic  employment.
The Philippines  has  also  undergone  a significant  regulatory  reform. The deregulation  and
privatization  efforts under  the Ramos  regime  have  served  to attract  FDI and  stimulate  the economy. The
Foreign Investment  Act of 1991  removed  many  restrictions  on foreign  equity  participation  and  liberalized
performance  requirements.  Fewer  sectors  are on  the 'negative  list' that  prohibits  FDI.  General  fiscal
incentives  and  tax treatment  are  also  ensured  by the Omnibus  Investment  code  of 1987
12  The business  survey  of the  World Economic  Forum  (1998)  has  consistently  given  Singapore  the premier  ranking
as  the most  competitive  economy  in the world (above  Hong  Kong and  the  United  States).
13  Full foreign  equity ownership  may  only be granted  on for those  operations  exporting  over 80 percent  of total
production. For projects  exporting  between  51  % and  79%  of production,  foreign  equity  may  reach  a maximum  of
79% depending  on other  criteria. Projects  that  export  less  than  20%  of production  may  only involve foreign  equity
participation  up  to a maximum  30%.
21Indonesia  also  introduced  a significant  foreign  investment  deregulation  package  in 1994.
Essentially,  this legislation  liberalized  foreign  equity  restrictions  and  divestment  requirements  and
simplified  procedures. Indonesia, however, still excludes FDI from a wide range of activities  including
retail trade and various manufacturing industries.  National treatment has not been  granted to
multinationals.  and former president Suharto personally approved every FDIproject.  In response  to the
recent financial crisis, Indonesia introduced several  reforms in fall  1997. Foreign shareholding limits  of
49 percent in firms  other than financial firms were eliminated and full  ownership of non-bank financial
firms,  such as insurance firms, granted.  Wholesaling by foreign manufacturing affiliates  was removed
from the negative list and retail trade will  be permitted in 2003.
Thailand's basic legislative FDI framework has remained largely unchanged since the 1950s and
entails wide ranging measures. For example, majority foreign shareholding was restricted in all but
export-oriented projects until the 1997 financial crisis when the Board of Investment raised the
ownership limit  to 51 percent. The Investment Promotion Act of 1977  introduced investment incentives
for projects in desirable sectors such as energy and manufacturing while the Alien Business Law of 1972
restricted foreign entry into sensitive sectors such  as agriculture and fishing, mining, and services.
While  investment measures  almost certainly tend to distort multinational  activity and
international trade, there is little  empirical evidence on their significance in the region or elsewhere
(Maskus and Eby 1990, Konan and Yue 1994). One problem is that descriptive data on investment
measures  is rather weak and generally not standardized  across  countries.  Statues concerning FDI may
not fully  describe the investment climate as regulations may be negotiable, redundant, or non-binding.
Several survey studies have relied mainly on voluntary reporting of multinationals  operating under these
m~asures. These firms  reflect a selected sample of those deciding to enter in spite of restrictions  or
perhaps because of incentives and may not portray a full picture of the FOI environment.  Surveyed
MNEs  may also have the usual incentives to misstate the extent to which they are influenced by
investment measures. Finally,  investment measures  may influence firm behavior on many complex
22levels including  not only the entry decision but also firm size, composition of employment, intra-firm
international trade, and technology transfers.
Nonetheless, we can gain a limited  understanding of the presence of investment measures in the
region from available survey data. The World Economic Forum (1995) surveyed international business
regarding the FDI regulatory practices of various countries (Table 9).  Singapore's FDI regime ranks
especially well relative to nearly any economy, and often above the average for developed countries.
Other ASEANs  did not rate nearly as well in some  categories  relative to non-Asian developing countries.
There is apparently a preference in much of ASEAN  for minority  participation of foreign investors, most
notably in Malaysia and Thailand as described above. Foreign investors are sometimes perceived as
receiving less than equal treatment relative to domestic companies. With the exceptional case of
Singapore, immigration  law hampers  the ability  of investors to employ foreigners and limits  accessibility
to those skills.  In addition to visa restrictions, employers in Malaysia are taxed on their employment of
foreign workers and the levy generally rises with skill level.
On the other hand, ASEAN nations are well perceived in terms of their support of strategic
alliances between domestic and foreign firms as well as cross-border  ventures. While  the overall
assessment  of the ASEAN  DFI environment is viewed as weaker than that on average in developed
countries, it is better than that elsewhere in Asia and not perceivably different from non-Asian
developing economies. The World Economic Forum (1995) survey also included questions on
transactions costs related to FDI, Table 10.
4. ASEAN  integration
Until fairly recently  economic  cooperation  was  not high on  the agenda  of ASEAN policy makers,
with more effort made  towards  preventing  regional  differences  from erupting  into armed  conflict.
ASEAN did adopt  aPT  A in the mid-1970'  s. but  the  coverage  of this agreement  was  too narrow  to be
meaningful. As the benefits  of trade-driven  economic  growth  became  apparent,  meaningful  regional
23member  state  a staggered  reduction  in tariff rates  to be applied  to intra-ASEAN  trade.14  Ultimately, this
Secretariat).  The exclusion  list is composed  of General  Exceptions  made  for reasons  of security  and/or
for sensitive  products  to be included  in the CEPT  scheme  by the year  2000. The scheme  includes  an
ASEAN- wide content  requirement  of 40% for a product  to be eligible for CEPT  concessions.  While
AFT  A originally targeted  tariff reductions,  subsequent  efforts liberalize  other  forms of border  protection
such  as  quantitative  restrictions,  import  surcharges,  and  disparate  customs  procedures  which impede
trade. Some  non-tariff barriers  are  to be eliminated  5 years  from the enjoyment  of concessions.
Harmonization  of standards  has  entered  the agenda,  with priority to be given  to heavily  traded
manufactures.
The amount  of trade  that will be impacted  by AFT  A is not  inconsequential.  Member  exports
within ASEAN accounted  for 23.2%  of total member  exports  in 1996,  a figure that  has  remained  steady
for the past  several  decades.  This is the same  magnitude  as that  for MERCOSUR  (22.8%),  but still less
than  the European  Union (61.5%)  or NAFfA  (47.5%). US multinational  affiliates hosted  by the Asia
Pacific region  (excluding  Japan)  sold over  half of their output  within the region  (U.S. DOC 1998). While













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)small  by the standards  of regional  blocs that  include  a developed  nation,  ASEANs 1996  percentage  of
internal  exports  is still greater  than  that of any  other  bloc among  non-developed  countries  [World Bank
(1998),  Table  6.6].  However,  intra-regional  trade  still accounts  for a mere  9.2% of regional  GDP.
Furthermore,  Singapore  is the largest  trading  partner  in terms  of imports or exports  of every  one of the
ASEAN-5, so it may  be the case  that  these  countries  have  similar enough  comparative  advantages  that
they are in competition  with each other.  Still, the pattern of trade distortion which the CEPT is meant to
rectify could easily  be the main  culprit behind  the observed  trade  flows (or lack  thereof). Frankel  (1997)
does  find a consistent  positive intra-regional  bias in trade  flows for every  year from 1965  to 1992,  though
as  mentioned  before  Singapore  could  be largely  responsible  for this.15  Looking at  total bloc member
exports  as  a percent  of total world exports,  ASEAN appears  to be more  important  to the rest of the world
than other  non-developed  country  groupings,  with the region  accounting  for 6.3% of world exports
compared  to MERCOSUR's  1.4%. This suggests  ASEAN to be relatively  important  to the global pattern
of trade  relative  to other  groupings  of developing  countries.
More recently,  there  have  been  nascent  moves  to liberalize  investment  within ASEAN.  A 1987
agreement  for the Promotion  and  Protection  of Investments  made  the initial effort, moving  to accord
ASEAN-based  firm fair and  equitable  treatment  in other  member  countries  in the form of national
treatment  of such  and prohibition on discrimination  against  firms from member  countries. The
agreement  also  protects  regional  firms against  expropriation  and  guarantees  the  unhindered  repatriation
of capital and  earnings. A protocol  to amend  the agreement  was  agreed  upon  in September  1996,  which
urged  members  to simplify their investment  procedures  and  approval  process  and  make  transparent  and
predictable  the laws and  regulations  pertaining  to foreign  investment  in member  countries. In the works
is a Framework  Agreement  on  an ASEAN Investment  Area (AlA), expected  to be signed  in 1998. The
stated objective  of the AIA  is to attract greater FDI into the region from both ASEAN  and non-ASEAN
15  In other  words,  on  average  ASEAN countries  trade  six  times  more  than  other  countries  of similar size  and
proximity.  Though  AFTA was  only implemented  in 1993,  ASEAN  has  been  a forum for regional  consultation  and
cooperation  for three  decades.
27sources.  This effort essentially  seeks  to establish  a "one stop  shop" for investors  that might  be interested
in the region. It should  be noted  that liberalization  of investment  mechanisms  is only part of this effort.
The AlA also aims  to boost  cooperation,  facilitation, promotion  and  awareness.  Sample  projects  include
an ASEAN  Supporting Industry Database  to provide an "information  mart" for supporting industries for
manufacturers  and  suppliers  of ASEAN countries,  a compendium  on investment  policy and  measures  of
ASEAN countries,  and  a Directory of ASEAN Technology  Suppliers  to facilitate intra-ASEAN sourcing
of technology  and  promote  local technology  suppliers  to third countries.
5. Prospects  for FDI in the AFT  A
A growing proportion  of international  trade  within ASEAN appears  to be conducted  through
multinational  operations.  Thus  the potential  responsiveness  of foreign  investors  to deeper  regional
integration  through  AFTA is highly deserving  of attention.  As this analysis  has  indicated,  however,
concrete  predictions  regarding  the direction,  let alone  the magnitude,  of the effect of trade  liberalization
on FDI is exceedingly  complicated  for several  reasons.  First, FDI arises  in response  to multiple layers  of
distortions such  as governmental  policies  and  imperfect  competition. As is commonly  know, liberalizing
one distortion such  as  intra-regional  tariff barriers  in a second-best  setting  with potentially offsetting
distortions  generally  yield indeterminate  comparative  statics  results. Second,  the AFf A may  introduce
new  distortions. The negotiators  go to great  lengths  to assure  that  an AFT  A would reflect guiding
principles of 'open  regionalism'  and  current  practices  of broad  and  non-discriminatory  liberalization
appear  to bear  that  out. Still, preferential  trade  liberalization  is itself a piecemeal  and  distortionary  form
of liberalization. Finally, we have  an incomplete  picture of the current  microeconomics  of FDI in the
region  due  to data  limitations and  problems  drawing  comparisons  across  countries,  as  is evident  from our
review of descriptive  statistics. While we may  not  be able  to provide  a conclusive  analysis,  we can
certainly  indicate  the major  forces  that will influence  FDI after  AFfA.
16  Joint  Press  Statement,  Meeting  of the Fourth  ASEAN  Heads  of Investment  Agencies,  Singapore,  24 July 1998.
28One of the most  important  motivations  for FDI is that of servicing  the regional  market  and  we
believe  this will be enhanced  under  AFr A.  This view  differs from that of others  such  as  Athukorala  and
Menon (1997)  who recognize  that  import-substitute  FDI is currently  low in the region. This, in our  view,
is due  to two important  factors. First, barriers  on intra-regional  trade  are currently  relatively  high,
limiting the market  platform for foreign  subsidiaries.  For  example,  Thailand  has  a weighted  mean  tariff
rate of roughly  44 percent  on manufacturing  and  similar  barriers  in Indonesia  and  the Philippines  are well
over twenty percent  (Table  2).  Relaxing  barriers  amongst  trade  within ASEAN should  significantly
increase  the regions  market  appeal  and  stimulate  import-substitute  forms of FDI. The market  size  of
ASEAN has  grown rapidly over  that  past  fifteen  years,  although  the present  economic  crisis and currency
devaluations  have  dampened  consumer  demand.  As incomes  have  increased,  so  has  the demand  for a
wide variety  of consumer  and  capital  goods. Second,  foreign  participation  in domestic  retail, wholesale
and  service  activities  has  been  heavily  regulated  in some  ASEAN countries  such  as  Thailand. That most
FDI is export  oriented  is, in part,  governed  by the incentive  and  performance  requirements  of most
regional  governments  who favor both  exports  and  manufacturing  activities. Unless  these  restrictions  on
foreign involvement  in domestic  sales  change  significantly,  we would anticipate  little growth in FDI
oriented  to servicing  the post-AFT  A ASEAN region  in heavily  regulated  nations.
Our previous  theoretical  work (Konan  and  Heinrich 1997)  has  shown  that such  market
stimulation  should  tend  to increase  investment  most  in economically  small  countries,  such  as  Laos,
Philippines  and  Viet Nam,  as their firms will have  access  to a larger  regional  market. Investment  will
also  tend to be redistributed  from relatively  high tariff countries  (to the extent  that  multinationals  have
already  entered  to overcome  this barrier)  to relatively  low tariff countries.  The investment  attractiveness
of Singapore  and  Malaysia,  for example,  would be enhanced  by AFT  A as  their subsidiaries  can  service
nations  with high  barriers  against  non-ASEAN  trade.
As do Athukorala  and  Menon  (1997)  and  Dobson  and  Yue (1997),  we also  believe  that
multinational  firms will also  be attracted  to the AFT  A region  because  of an  enhanced  ability to
29countries  more  suited  to low value-added  activities,  such  as  assembly,  and  countries  with relatively
engineering.  As evident  by the Singapore  experience,  once  low value  activities  have  been  mastered  and
have  tended  to used  investment  measure  to attract  "desirable"  sorts  of investment.  However,  this effort
has  focused  its attention  largely on  entire  industries  rather  than on individual stages  of the production
process.  We recommend  such  measures  be liberalized  to facilitate intra-regional  linkages  in production
that will likely emerge  in response  to AFT  A.  Multinationals  are  also  attracted  to economies  with skilled
workers  and  good local infrastructure.  The is no foreseeable  limit to the amount  of human  capital  that
can  be accumulated,  so policy measures  which  focus  on raising  the skills of the local population  such  as
education  can really payoff for countries  that  are  patient  enough  to stick with what  is necessarily  an
inter-generational  strategy. Providing  good  infrastructure  would benefit  and attract  multinationals,  but
would have  a much  more significant  positive impact  on  the  competitiveness  of local firms. Those  factors
that  are  good for MNEs are  good for everyone,  and  this win-win approach  could lay the foundation  for a
second  East  Asian  miracle
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